





CENTRO RICERCHE E DOCUMENTAZIONE  
SULL'ANTICHITÀ CLASSICA  
MONOGRAFIE

Istituto Italiano per la Storia Antica

UMR 7044 Archimède

# L'età di Silla

Atti del convegno  
Istituto italiano per la storia antica  
Roma, 23-24 marzo 2017

a cura di

MARIA TERESA SCETTINO e GIUSEPPE ZECCHINI

«L'ERMA» di BRETSCHNEIDER

MARIA TERESA SCHETTINO e GIUSEPPE ZECCHINI (a cura di)  
*L'età di Silla*

Atti del convegno  
Istituto italiano per la storia antica  
Roma, 23-24 marzo 2017

© Copyright 2018 «L'ERMA» di BRETSCHNEIDER  
Via Marianna Dionigi, 57 – Roma

Tutti i diritti riservati. È vietata la riproduzione  
di testi e illustrazioni senza il permesso scritto dell'Editore

Il volume è stato sottoposto a procedura di Peer-Review

**Maria Teresa Schettino e Giuseppe Zecchini** (a cura di)  
*L'età di Silla*. Atti del convegno Istituto italiano per la  
storia antica. Roma, 23-24 marzo 2017 - Roma:  
L'ERMA» di BRETSCHNEIDER, 2018 - 268 p. cm. -

ISBN (CARTACEO) 978-88-913-1696-7  
ISBN (DIGITALE) 978-88-913-1699-8

CDD 930

1. Silla, Lucio Cornelio

Volume stampato con il contributo dell'Istituto italiano per la Storia antica

## SOMMARIO

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| Presentazione .....  | V   |
| EDWARD H. BISPHAM<br><i>Sulla and the Populi Italici</i> .....   | 1   |
| GIOVANNI BRIZZI<br><i>Silla comandante</i> .....   | 45  |
| MARIANNE COUDRY<br><i>La réforme syllanienne du sénat: une réévaluation?</i> .....                                       | 73  |
| JEAN-MICHEL DAVID<br><i>Sylla nomothète</i> .....  | 91  |
| MICHEL HUMM<br><i>De l'usage de l'histoire romaine par Sylla :<br/>inventions ou réélaborations ?</i> .....              | 105 |
| ELIO LO CASCIO<br><i>Silla, la moneta e il credito</i> .....   | 133 |
| SYLVIE PITTIA<br><i>Solidarités et conflits de générations dans la vie politique romaine<br/>au temps de Sylla</i> ..... | 149 |
| KAJ SANDBERG<br><i>Sulla's Reform of the Legislative Process</i> .....   | 167 |
| FEDERICO SANTANGELO<br><i>La marcia su Roma dell'88 a.C.</i> .....   | 191 |
| MARIA TERESA SCETTINO<br><i>Un magistrato senza eloquenza: Silla e l'oratoria comiziale</i> .....                        | 205 |

CATHERINE STEEL

*Past and present in Sulla's dictatorship*..... 225

UWE WALTER

*Die Dictatur Sullas – ein Wendepunkt für die römische  
Historiographie?* ..... 239

GIUSEPPE ZECCHINI

*Per una nuova immagine di Silla*..... 255

## PRESENTAZIONE

Si presentano in questo volume gli Atti della giornata di studi dedicata a Silla e al suo tempo, che è stata promossa dall'Istituto Italiano per la storia antica e dall'UMR 7044 Archimède (Universités de Strasbourg et de Haute-Alsace, CNRS) il 23-24 marzo 2017: questa iniziativa è il primo frutto della collaborazione tra l'Istituto e il prestigioso Centro di Ricerca francese in seguito alla firma di un accordo per sviluppare progetti scientifici in comune avvenuta il 18 marzo 2016 da parte del Direttore dell'UMR 7044 prof. Frédéric Colin e del Presidente dell'Istituto prof. Andrea Giardina.

Alla giornata di studi sono intervenuti, su invito dell'Istituto, dodici studiosi di atenei italiani (Giovanni Brizzi - Bologna, Elio Lo Cascio – Roma 'La Sapienza'), francesi (Marianne Coudry, Michel Humm e Maria Teresa Schettino – UMR Archimède, Jean-Michel David e Sylvie Pittia – Paris I Sorbonne), britannici (Edward Bispham – Oxford, Federico Santangelo – Newcastle upon Tyne, Catherine Steel – Glasgow), finlandesi (Kaj Sandberg – Helsinki) e tedeschi (Uwe Walter – Bielefeld).

Il loro impegno nel presentare le rispettive relazioni ha permesso che si sviluppasse già in quella circostanza un vivace dibattito; a poco più di un anno di distanza la comparsa di questo volume testimonia che quell'impegno non è stato episodico: dai testi emerge una rinnovata immagine di Silla, di cui si è cercato di dar conto nelle 'Conclusioni'.

I nostri ringraziamenti sono rivolti certamente ai relatori e a tutti i partecipanti a quell'incontro di studio, ma in particolare al prof. Andrea Giardina per l'ospitalità concessa e alla dr. Anna Sabbi per l'impeccabile organizzazione della giornata.

M.T.S.- G.Z.





## SULLA AND THE POPULI ITALICI

This paper examines relations between Sulla and the Italians, from the Social War to his death; it will also consider relations between the Marian ‘faction’ and the Italians, interactions between the Senate and the Italians, and between new citizens and old. This last relationship reminds us of the crucial caveat, that to talk about what ‘Italians’ did, thought or wanted, let alone why, is to obscure vital differences between old citizens and new, ex-rebels and pro-Roman loyalists, land-owners and businessmen, traditionalists and modernisers, rich and poor, urban-dwellers in Etruria or Apulia and those who inhabited the *altipiani* of Samnium or the forested crags of Bruttium. Even within single communities we would be wrong to assume unanimity of outlook.

Nonetheless, the relationship(s) of Italians of all stripes with others, and with each other, constitute(s) a central topic of enquiry for this decade, which forms a vital bridge between very different worlds. One is the world of armed insurrection, Italia against Rome in the Social War; the other is the revival of what was meant to be a normal *res publica* from 81 onwards, in which Italians would have the first real chance to be part of the political community of the Romans as citizens, to engage with its traditions, customs and practices, and find their own place and negotiate new identities within that community. The same bridge led from a state torn apart by competing aspirations, in systemic dysfunction, and in 88-86, at times close to being a failed state<sup>1</sup>; to a community with the means and will to reassert control over its empire, and to find answers to continuing tensions within the resources of its traditional political culture. The 80s are fascinating in themselves, if difficult to access and apprehend; but crucial for understanding under what constraints a sort of normality returned during and after Sulla’s dictatorship; and what chances the restored *res publica* had looking forward, crucially in terms of the integration (or not) of the new citizens, whether as soldiers, farmers, traders, leaders or as communi-

---

<sup>1</sup> I have explored this idea in Bispham, forthcoming.

ties. The ability of the *res publica* to absorb the new citizens, and indeed of the new citizens to absorb the *res publica*, into their respective mental worlds, was central to the fate of the Republic, and the Roman imperial project more widely.

One paramount theme of this decade, then, is how, and with what ease and expectations, various parties crossed that bridge, in as far as they wished to do so (not all did); and how far various Romans, above all Sulla, viewed, opposed, encouraged or managed those attempts at transit from one political and ideological world to another. This paper looks again at admittedly meagre evidence, to assess the interactions of different Italians, of Cinnans and of Sulla at various stages along the way. It does not aim to offer anything radically new, but instead aims to probe at some parts of the established picture, and to present a more nuanced account. Considerations of space mean not only that much of Sulla's work as dictator in spheres not directly affecting Italy and Italians will be discussed only tangentially, or taken for granted; but also that major topics which are crucial to the Italian experience, namely Sulla's increase in the size of the Senate, and his veteran colonies, receive only passing treatment<sup>2</sup>. Likewise, I shall not give a political or military narrative except where the events, or the constructions put upon them by ancient or modern commentators, require analysis.

### *Cinna and the New Citizens*

In 87 Cinna promulgated anew one of the bills which had had such fatal consequences for P. Sulpicius when he had brought it forward the previous year: the distribution of the new citizens across the thirty-one rural voting tribes (there is no reason that the new citizens should have ended up, or wanted to end up, in the four urban tribes; no community of old or new citizens was registered in any of those tribes). Cinna's legislation, like that of Sulpicius, sought to end the disadvantageous situation which prevailed already before the end of the Social War, whereby the new citizens had been confined to newly created voting tribes, probably eight in number, which voted last, after the thirty-five existing tribes. As a consequence,

---

<sup>2</sup> An excellent treatment of Sullan colonies: SANTANGELO 2007: 134-91; for discussion of Sulla's new senators: classic treatments in GABBA 1976: 59-67, 142-50; cf. WISEMAN 1971: 6, 8, 76, 100, 146; also SANTANGELO, 2006; ID., 2007: 100-2, and Steele (this volume).

says Appian, their votes were ‘often useless’ (*BC* 1. 49. 215, 53. 231, 64. 287)<sup>3</sup>. It is also Appian who claims that the impetus behind reviving this bill came from the friends of those who had been declared *hostes* and exiled in 88, and not from Cinna himself. The bill was strongly identified, Appian implies, with Marius; it was thought that a reconfigured tribal assembly would be able to restore him and the other exiles to Rome (and, no doubt, re-instate him in the Mithridatic command). Appian also claims that although Cinna encouraged the exiles’ supporters, he had been bribed to the tune of 300 talents to do so.

These claims need to be weighed carefully. To take the last point first, we may doubt that Cinna needed such encouragement to pursue one of the few paths open to him to build a power-base which could secure him against Sulla’s return, or the machinations of Sulla’s allies. More important is the association of the bill with Marius, as is its adoption by a faction within the élite (that is, a group of aristocrats who shared a common aim in the return of the exiles, if only that). The danger of personalizing political initiatives, and reducing them to the ambitions or beliefs of the major players about whom our sources tell us more, is as dangerous as the construction of imaginary cabals of unnamed nobles held together by shared ideological positions. And yet this bill did, as we shall see, have ideological traction, and was, I believe, consciously exploited for this very reason, even if its multiple proponents (also) used its ideological force (equality of political rights) to further specific and individual aims which had little to do with wider political rights (rescinding a bill of outlawry; transferring *imperium* from a proconsul to a *priuatus*). Very broad and very narrow agendas could co-exist.

Moreover, if the end-game was to bring back the exiles, we may legitimately ask whether their friends had thought through the implications of their plan: they aimed to pass a radical bill, in favour of a group whose vote was currently of doubtful potency at best, to the detriment of another group whose vote normally dominated the assembly, and who were, on past form, unlikely to surrender their privileges freely. And *if* they managed to have the bill passed in the teeth of opposition, how quickly did they expect to enjoy the benefits which Appian claims that they sought?<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> The evidence is not unambiguous, but Velleius speak of 8 tribes (2. 20. 2), and Appian of new tribes (*BC* 1. 49. 214). I have laid out the interpretation I prefer in BISPHAM 2007: 178-83, 189f.

<sup>4</sup> I took a more straightforward view of the question in BISPHAM 2007: 178.

Progress in reorganizing Italy after the Social War was negligible, at best, by 87: some of those who supported the bill should have had at least a suspicion that the distribution of the new citizens across the old rural tribes could take months at best, and might take years, bringing little comfort to the exiles. Similar questions have been asked about the intentions of Kleisthenes in Athens in the late sixth century: did he really imagine his complex reshuffling of demes, trittyes and tribes could produce a quick and lasting gerrymander for the Alkmaionids and their friends? Or was he after a more disinterested functional redrawing of the administrative map, and thereby the political process, in the interests of greater democratization? Given the very real practical difficulties, might we not find space in Cinna's bill for some agenda for disinterested change? For Cicero, albeit at his most disingenuous, the core of the struggle that followed between Cinna and the *optimates* (which he witnessed as a teenager) was about the 'votes of the new citizens'<sup>5</sup>.

The bill brought huge crowds ('from the whole of Italy', *totius Italiae*: Vell. Pat. 2. 20. 3) into the city as the vote approached. As noted, they could only have voted last; their purpose was rather to intimidate the old citizens, who opposed the measure no less strongly than they had the year before. Senatorial conservatives (Velleius' *optimates*) naturally opposed the 'deregulation' of comitial voting that would follow from the distribution across the rural tribes of tens of thousands of new voters, independent of traditional structures of deference and ideological control. The other consul, Octavius, led the opposition, formed of what Appian calls the 'more reputable' part of the *plebs* (although he wisely, or well-informed, remained at home when the vote was scheduled to take place).

The supporters of both sides were ready for violence on the day of the vote, carrying daggers into the Forum inside their clothing; the new citizens chanted in favour of the passage of the bill. It was never put to the vote, however, as the majority of the tribunes interposed their veto, presumably as it was being read out; the new citizens then produced their weapons, and attacked the tribunes on the Rostra. Octavius now appeared at the head of the Via Sacra, leading a large body of men, surely prepared for just this eventuality (some have thought the *SCU* had been passed at

---

<sup>5</sup> Cic., *Phil.* 8.7 (he goes on to claim that the quarrel of Sulla with Carbo and Marius junior was against tyrannu, not over the Italians' rights); cf. Livy, *Per.* 79; Vell. Pat., 2. 20. 2f; Exuperantius, 4 23; Schol. Gronov. p. 286St.

this juncture). He may have been aiming simply to separate the contending parties, and to regain the initiative; he certainly achieved the latter by driving Cinna off the steps of the Temple of Castor, used as a speakers' platform<sup>6</sup>, but his men, apparently without orders, started a massacre of the new citizens. Appian is clear that the *optimates* had fewer men (*BC* 1. 65. 293), but they must have been better armed than the new citizens (or, perhaps more likely, the number of the new citizens armed was actually small), as they killed a number, drove the rest from the city. Cinna was reduced to offering freedom to slaves who would join him, a sign that he feared a *hostis*-declaration was imminent; when this produced no results he was forced to leave the city, and set out for the Latin communities recently enfranchised, Tibur and Praeneste<sup>7</sup>, and thence to Campania, where there were of Roman troops stationed. His aim, according to Appian (*BC* 1. 65. 294), was to incite these communities to revolt against Rome (*apostasias*), by providing men and money. Octavius in turn persuaded the Senate to abrogate of Cinna's consulship; as the latter had feared, he was, like Sulpicius, declared a *hostis*, for deserting Rome during an emergency, and offering freedom to slaves. L. Cornelius Merula, the *flamen Dialis*, was made suffect in his place.

Cinna reached Capua; here he made a theatrical appeal to the army, stressing not only the wrong done to him, but the threat to the sovereignty of the People represented by the Senate's decision to abrogate his magistracy, a decision which was never confirmed by a popular vote. His histrionics, ending in tearing his robes and leaping from the *tribunal* into the crowd, struck the right chord: the army raised him up and made clear he was still consul as far as they were concerned, and that they would follow him without question; oaths of loyalty were administered. Velleius (2. 20. 4) has a similar story about Nola, where the army was besieging some of the last Social War rebels: here bribery, first of the officers and then of the men, won over the army. There is no pressing reason to think that this is a historical doublet, even if the accounts of what happened at Nola and at Capua may have mutually infected each other<sup>8</sup>.

Now once again a legitimate *imperium*-holder, Cinna turned again to

<sup>6</sup> See Gartrell forthcoming on political uses of the Temple of Castor.

<sup>7</sup> The other communities of the *Prisci Latini* enfranchised in 90 B.C. seem to have been Bovillae, Castimoenium, Cora, Gabii and possibly Labici; of these perhaps only Cora was worth the trouble of a visit by Cinna's men: Bispham 2007: 462f.

<sup>8</sup> Cinna's adventures: App., *BC* 1. 64. 286-66. 302.

the communities of the new citizens, stressing the risks he was taking for their benefit. Here we see the first of many examples of the confused and fuzzy nature of the coalitions which sprang up in these years. Cinna became a serious figure for the new citizens, some of whom will have been former Social War rebels, in part because of their own self-interest, in part because he now looked legitimate, and in part because he had the military backing of the very men tasked with ending the Social War. That said, not all of these new citizens who supported Cinna will have been ex-rebels, and this leads us to a point which has received insufficient attention. Scholars speak of Cinna relying on ‘ex-rebel new citizens’. Yet his movements place him mainly in Latium Vetus, Latium Adiectum and Campania (although he surely also sought support further afield). Of these areas only Campania contained any significant number of ex-rebel communities, and of these some had had to be forced into joining the revolt. The majority of the new citizen communities were those of former *socii* such as Teanum Sidicinum and Casinum, or the Hernici, as well as Latin colonies like Setia, Signia, Norba, Suessa Aurunca and Cales, none of which had rebelled, as far as we know. Of other areas of Italy all we can say for certain is that Etruria joined in only when Marius arrived, and that the Samnites were also later additions to his cause (although they were not at this point *noui ciues*). The new citizen communities of greater Latium and Campania had been spared much of the worst fighting of the war; they had also laboured under the disadvantages of the new voting arrangements as long as any, and had more reason to feel disillusioned than the *dediticii*. The tribal arrangement was after all, for them, a poor reward for loyalty to Rome. They were populous and wealthy, and that population and wealth had probably suffered significantly less attrition in the Social War than was the case on the rebel side. I would argue that Cinna’s support came mainly from these areas, as well as Etruria and Samnium later, and that the demographic strength of these areas explains to a large degree the significant numbers of recruits the Cinnan commanders were able to raise down to 83. If this is so, then we should in fact not see Cinna’s re-militarization of a part of Italy, at least at the outset, as a revival of the Social War.

Cinna’s appeal in these communities was evidently considerable: money and large numbers of men were supplied, speaking to the degree of resentment among the new citizens about the way they had been politically sidelined by the Senate. Velleius (2. 20. 4) says that Cinna raised over 300 cohorts, and was thus able to bring thirty legions up to strength; not since

the Social War had so many Italians come together under arms. It is worth pausing to think a little more about the implications of these troop numbers. There is a spectrum of possibilities for imagining how these 300 cohorts were made up – but in any case the process must have been the same as any pre-Social War tumultuary levy. At one extreme we may imagine that Cinna's emissaries ranged far and wide, visiting new citizen communities across central Italy; I say central Italy since it seems that the approach to the Samnites was made subsequently, and that the adhesion of the Etruscans was also later, consequent upon Marius' return. But let us say central Italy, from northern Samnium up to Etruria and Umbria; on such a scenario a large number of communities will have offered men and money, and the 300 cohorts can be divided between these towns, each contributing a modest total to make up a large overall figure. At the other end of the spectrum, we might imagine that a smaller number of towns contributed a correspondingly larger number of men. I argued above that Cinna's presence and recruitment was concentrated in the communities of Latium Vetus, Latium Adiectum and northern Campania, where I have hypothesized that men and money were easier to come by, and grievances more strongly felt. This entails that a more restricted number of new citizen communities would have each provided significant numbers of recruits. It might be objected that such contributions would have to impossibly large to supply 300 cohorts, but we should remember that, according to John Rich's persuasive analysis, the vast armies of the Social and Civil Wars can only have been raised by levying those who were below *assiduus* status (*proletarii* in Roman parlance) as well as those who in allied states corresponded to *assidui*. In these communities closer to Rome, where the city could be reached within a day's walk, the exercise of political rights, at least in the *concilium plebis* and *comitia tributa*, was a real possibility for ordinary voters as well as élites; frustration with the initial tribal arrangements after the war will thus have been something which in these communities reached right to the bottom of the timocratic scale, whereas in the more distant new-citizen communities the disillusioned will have been mainly members of the élite. Given how little evidence we have about where Cinna's forces came from<sup>9</sup>, no firm assertions are tenable, but I do regard it as likely that one explanation for the large number of recruits is that Cinna drew heavily on the discontented of

---

<sup>9</sup> It is for instance possible that Cinna also exploited contacts made during tentative peace negotiations with the Marsi in 89, when he had been a *legatus* (Livy, *Per.* 76).



all classes in Latium Vetus, Latium Adiectum and northern Campania, with significant support later added from Etruria, where those in the south of the region will have felt the same grievances in the same way<sup>10</sup>.

Octavius and Merula now began to strengthen the defences of the city, and to try to raise their own troops, from loyal Italian towns and from Cisalpinga, as well as summoning Pompeius Strabo from the Adriatic (Appian, *BC* 1. 66. 303). He led what may have been the largest field army in Italy, which he had refused to hand over to Pompeius Rufus the consul of 88, leading to the latter's death; Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius (*pr.* 89) at this time commanded further forces in Samnium (Appian, *BC* 1. 68. 309-10)<sup>11</sup>. Velleius places at this point Cinna's decision to recall C. Marius and his son (2. 20. 5), which we recall was apparently one of the ultimate objectives of his tribal bill. Marius landed at Telamon in Etruria with his son and other exiles; local Etruscans came to support him, as well as old-citizen Romans, and with this support he quickly joined himself to the Cinna's cause. In the process he lost no opportunity to advertise to the new citizens his own *res gestae* on behalf of Italy as a whole, and his more specific support for the proposed tribal redistribution, which Appian says went down well: he had amassed 6,000 Etruscan supporters, by the time he reached Cinna's camp<sup>12</sup>.

Cinna's army, or rather four armies, invested Rome; another force, perhaps under Marius Gratidianus, was sent to Ariminum perhaps to block reinforcements coming from Cisalpinga. The Cinna's accepted the support of (or took hold of) Latin towns with stockpiles of grain: Antium, Aricia, Lanuvium, some of which were betrayed into admitting them within the walls; Ostia Marius took by force. The texture of the conflict as one between a largely new citizen army on the one hand, and Pompeius' veteran Social War army, afforded by some Italians, is worth noting, but for the reasons given above, this conflict again should be seen more as a remilitarisation, than a revival of the Social War. The Senate, worried that its forces were numerically inferior, looked about for reinforcements. The

<sup>10</sup> Cf. GABBA, *Comm.* 183 (Tibur and Praeneste 'avevano forse maggiori motivi di irritazione'). RICH 1983: 328 stresses the proletarian character of the civil war armies; BRUNT 1987: 89 downplays the contribution of the new citizens to Cinna's army; see also 440-5 on troop numbers in this period, skeptical on Velleius' numbers, for example. We should however note that the force which was sent east with Valerius Flaccus as the 'official' army sent by the Cinna regime against Mithridates in 87 was small (two legions: App., *Mithridatica* 51. 205); recruitment was easier for some causes than others. An Etruscan hospes betrayed the brothers C. & L. CAESAR in 87 (Cic., *de or.* 3. 8).

<sup>11</sup> SEAGER 1994: 174f.

<sup>12</sup> Plut. *Sert.* 5, *Mar.* 41. 3f.; App., *BC* 1. 67. 305-6; Gran. Lic. 13-14 Criniti. This level of support is presumably at the root of Exuperantius' claim that the Marians were responsible for the enfranchisement of Etruria.

only army that could be withdrawn to defend the city was that of Metellus in Samnium; he was now instructed to make peace. The Samnites, however, made demands to which Metellus could not accede (mindful perhaps of the Varian trials of a few years before, as well as the dignity of the Roman People). The Samnites (and we should perhaps include the Lucanians here too) sought the citizenship (they had not been given it with the other *dediticii populi*, as they had made no *deditio*); but in addition that those who had deserted to them should have it too, that their property should be restored to them by the Romans, that they should keep the booty they had taken, and that Rome should restore Samnite prisoners and deserters<sup>13</sup>.

This would equate to a return to the *status quo ante*, with the important addition that the Samnites now had the citizenship, as well as a *de facto* independence (see Diodoros, 37. 2 for Samnite and Lucanian operations in Bruttium), reflected in their ability to dictate terms. As I have argued elsewhere, these were years in which the Romans granted the citizenship to the defeated Italian demands (although they couched this in a rhetoric which proclaimed generosity from a position of strength) because they were too weak, and too beset by other problems, to do otherwise<sup>14</sup>. Metellus' refusal to have any truck with the Samnites is a rare instance of a Roman commander having the strength of character to refuse Italian demands (and he was compelled to withdraw from theatre anyway by the situation in Rome). Marius, ever the opportunist, and having recently polished his pro-Italian credentials, stepped in and offered, through his legate Fimbria, everything which Metellus had refused, and an agreement was struck, which, Granius tells us, Cinna (later) confirmed by a *lex*. The Samnites then engaged and destroyed the troops Metellus had left in Samnium with his legate Plautius. A understanding was thus established which was predicated on a different view of the relationship between the various elements of Italy than that which had prevailed a year before. Essentially the Samnites were being treated as an independent power with whom peace and alliance (a real *foedus aequum*) could be made, a far cry from the norms of Rome's asymmetric Italian alliance of the previous two centuries. Marius and Cinna had few scruples, and needed to win Samnite support, which was evidently worth having, away from Octavius: by agreeing to their demands they sanctioned the creation of a quasi-independent, if nominally Roman, state

<sup>13</sup> Livy, *Per.* 79; Appian, *BC* 1. 68. 309-10; Gran. Lic. pp. 16 Criniti; Dio fr. 102. 7.

<sup>14</sup> Bispham, forthcoming.

in the heart of Samnium. It is not anywhere said that the Samnites actually sent troops to help the Marian assault on Rome, but to exclude it absolutely would be to argue from silence<sup>15</sup>.

Other senatorial attempts to tap the reservoir of new-citizen manpower are witnessed by Granius Licinianus (p. 16 Criniti), who says ‘the citizenship having been given to all those who had surrendered (the *dediticii*), who, having promised many thousands of soldiers, sent barely fifteen (or sixteen) cohorts’ (this relates to 87 B.C.)<sup>16</sup>. This may be related to what seems to be a senatorial decree ‘granting the citizenship’ to those whom the epitomator of Livy calls *populi Italici* (*Per.* 80, for 87 B.C.). The *populi Italici* should be the former Social War rebels; but the text then goes on to mention the adherence of the Samnites and Lucanians to Cinna’s cause – might it be they who are the epitomator’s *Italici populi*? Of course it may also be that the epitomator simply misplaces the extension of the citizenship to the *dediticii populi*; but a garbling of some other reference to the citizenship seems more likely. We might imagine that the Senate either confirmed the (existing) citizenship of the ex-rebels (perhaps a vague undertaking to respect its political content in an attempt to counteract the propaganda of Cinna?); or that the citizenship was extended to some of the last groups of *dediticii* (but a popular law would be needed to confirm any such grant); or again that the epitomator has condensed separate events into a compacted and misleading narrative. That is, the same events narrated by Granius, albeit in a different order: the reminding of the *dediticii* by the Senate of their obligation as citizens to supply troops on request; the failure of the *dediticii* to enroll in large numbers; the attempt to enfranchise and come to terms with the Samnites; the deal between Marius and Cinna and the Samnites. It is unclear what the Senate thought it could expect from such a belated appeal to those same Italians whom the conservatives had hitherto treated as second-class citizens; in any case the sixteen (or fifteen) cohorts which they got clearly represented a disappointing return on what seem to have been extravagant promises<sup>17</sup>.

<sup>15</sup> Samnites and Lucanians not enfranchised with the *dediticii*: Livy, *Per.* 80 (‘the Samnites, who alone were still in possession of their arms’); App., *BC* 1. 53. 231 with BISPHAM 2007: 176-8. BENNETT 1923: 17; SEAGER 1994:175f.; MOURITSEN 1998: 166; KEAVENEY, 2005: 101; BISPHAM 2007: 182f.; DART 2014: 197, 199-200. One wonders if the state of affairs established here provided a model for Sertorius later in Spain.

<sup>16</sup> ‘Dediticiis populis ciuita<s> data, qui polliciti mult[a] milia militum uix XV[I] cohortes miserunt’.

<sup>17</sup> Bispham 2007: 180-3, where a slightly different range of explanations is explored; might one read here ‘ciuita<te> data’?. I still believe on balance that the majority of the *dediticii populi* were enfranchised in 88, and that at most Granius simply shows that some were still being enfranchised in 87, but that his text need not even indicated that. Other interpretations: TAYLOR 1960: 101f.; DART 2014: 196f.; in my view this fails to take account of all the relevant evidence.

With the failure of the attempts to woo the new citizens, and the death of Pompeius Strabo, the conservatives lacked the means and the stomach for a fight, and their position weakened as they tried to negotiate. Before long Marius and Cinna had entered the city, and a bloody purge of apparent enemies did duty for the decisive battle which had been avoided. Marius and Cinna made themselves consuls for the next year, although Marius did not live to enjoy his fated seventh consulship for long. Later tradition (starting with Sulla's *Memoirs*) portrayed these years as *dominatio*, a tyranny<sup>18</sup>. Understanding the aims and even the achievements of the regime is not easy, given the hostility of many sources. Although we are not explicitly told in the sources, we must assume that Cinna re-introduced the tribal bill which had been vetoed at the start of 87<sup>19</sup>; we never hear unambiguously of dispute over the tribes again, and must infer the implementation of the bill from hints and allusions. Cinna had been swept back to power mainly by the discontent and political ambitions of the new citizens; *libertas italica*, to which we shall return, may be a watchword of these months; further, it has been suggested that it was the resentment of the new citizens against the conservatives which partly fueled the Marian purge<sup>20</sup>.

The tribal redistribution, when completed, would give the new citizens the voting equality they had desired in the *comitia tributa* and the *concilium plebis*. Yet the process was bound to be complex, and thus unlikely to have been accomplished quickly. One underlying principle seems to have been to keep the rural tribes in a rough demographic equilibrium (thus the Pollia, before the Social War the largest tribe, was not used in this exercise), which necessitated some sense of the demographic resources of each community, and would have some bearing on decisions about which communities to place in which tribes. This in turn entailed decisions about which new citizen communities would be autonomous (*municipia*) and which would be subordinate, and might thus be discounted as units in distributing new citizens across the tribes; in other words, the tribal distribution ought to have proceeded *pari passu* with some key decisions about municipalization. All of this meant that the resolution would not be quick, and some decisions may for all we know have met with challenges along

<sup>18</sup> Cinnan *dominatio*: Cic., *de or.* 3. 8 (but note *Brut.* 308, and LOVANO 2002: 64-8); D.S., 38. 2; Livy, *Ep.* 80; Vell. Pat., 2. 21. 8, 23. 3, cf. 24. 4; Tac., *Annals* 1. 1; Plut., *Sert.* 5; App., *BC* 1. 71. 325-74. 344; Seager 1994: 173-87. A more positive assessment in Lovano 2002, for example 45-9, 53-69.

<sup>19</sup> Dio, fr. 102. 8, does however mention a law introduced by Cinna recalling the exiles.

<sup>20</sup> DART 2014: 197f.; but if so we should expect Sullan propaganda to pick this up and exploit it alongside Marian cruelty, using it as justification for the proscriptions.